find that the cumulated ownership of the three largest shareholders has a negative effect on the dividend payout of Finnish firms.
Among control variables, firm size appears to reduce both the dividend payout and the dividend yield. A comparable effect, with a similar order of magnitude, is reported by Gugler and Yurtoglu (2005) regarding German firms. Consistent with Gul (1999) the influence of profitability is positive for dividend yield, but negative for dividend payouts. This could be explained, following Lintner (1956), by the fact that dividends are sticky. Firms that are more profitable have higher dividend payments, although the dividends are lower in proportion of (their higher) earnings. Controlling for endogenously, Jensen et al (1992) find that ROA has a positive effect on the dividend payouts of US firms. Taken together, it is more likely that the true role of profitability is reflected by its effect on dividend yield.
Both measures of growth opportunities are seen to have a positive effect on dividend payout and yield. The result is in sharp contrast to studies regarding US firms. Fama and French (2002) and Jensen et al. (1992) report negative coefficients for growth proxies.Farinha (2003) also report a negative effect on the dividend payout of UK firms, although the results appear to be sensitive to the model specification. On the other hand, Gul (1999) shows that growth opportunities have a positive and significant effect on the dividend yield, but an insignificant effect on dividend payout.
Benito and Young (2003) offer an interesting explanation to this puzzle by controlling for firm fixed effects (unobservable characteristics). Examining a sample of UK firms, they show that non-payers are most often high growth firms, which have never paid dividends, rather than troubled firms seeking to repair their balance sheet by cutting dividend payments. It is more likely that Japanese firms adjust their dividend policies to business conditions, consistent with Dewenter and Warther (1998).
Finally, leverage is seen to have a negative effect on dividend payouts as in Jensen et al.(1992). Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) report a more negative sensitivity of about -0.46 for German firms compared with our result of -0.26 for Japanese firms. The positive coefficient on dividend yield seems to be due to the lower denominator (equity ratio) among highly-leveraged firms.
Although OLS is the commonly reported method for analyzing dividend payments, the fact that the dividend-to-equity ratio is bounded below zero can mean that OLS provides biased estimates. Following Barclay et al. (1995), we apply Tobit regressions to the censored dependent variable DYLD to check that we have consistent results.
Although 18.2% instances of observations are clustered at zero, the results appear qualitatively similar. Both proxies of ownership concentration Q2H and LHH are significantly negative with slightly more negative coefficients. Profitability (ROA) asset growth (GROW) and leverage (DEBT) retain their level of significance, but firm size and growth opportunities (Q) become less significant relative to OLS results.
Overall, the analysis confirms the negative influence of ownership concentration on dividend payouts.
Source: Kimie Harada, Pascal Nguyen, 2006“Ownership concentration, agency conflicts, and dividend policy in Japan” JEL Classifications: G35 .Working Paper Series
译文：
日本的股权集中度，代理冲突及股息政策
代理冲突在公司决策中发挥着重要作用。在他们的开创性论文中，延森和迈克林（1976）表明，决策者可以选择以价值递减的结果仅仅因为从其他利益相关者转移合理的财富。举一个众所周知的例子，管理者可以投资无益的由股东承担的项目成本，如果这样做提高自己的地位并且带给他们私人利益。同样，股东可能采取由债权人承担过度的风险，而他们从上部受益。
代理冲突可以有许多其他形式。迈尔斯和麦吉罗夫（1984）认为，企业在对现有股东的利益行事时，应理性地放过有利可图的投资项目，如果他们被外部投资者所捕获。胥利夫和维什尼（1997）强调多数与少数股东之间的代理冲突，最近的证据表明，主导股东以牺牲小投资者的资产和利润来提取租金，如使用控制实体之间的不公平转让定价。约翰逊等人 （2000）提供一个在发达国家进行征用的几个例子。
股利政策是决定一个企业无法逃避的代理冲突影响的因素。事实上，伊斯特布鲁克（1984）认为，红利可以是结果也可以是代理冲突的解决方案。因为管理者倾向于保留盈利增加私人消费或减轻对他们的人力资本风险，低治理标准和对贫困股东的保护可能导致较低的支出。这种观点显然是建立在拉帕塔等人的跨国分析（2000年）。相反，派息有助于缓解代理冲突。詹森（1986）主张以降低现金流量有效的提供给管理人员，以增加财政纪律。支付高额股息正是达到这一目的，从而给股东的监管提供了一种成本效益的替代品。
最近，古乐和郁塔路（2003）强调通过在德国的公司股利政策的股东之间寻找代理冲突的重要性。由于主导股东可以在其控制下从私人收益中提取现金流量，他们倾向于转换低股息。不过，另一大股东的存在可以抑制提取租金，最终导致更高的支出。
本文的目的是从机构的角度研究对日本企业的分红政策。如果股权集中度与管理层和股东之间的利益调整一致，作为企业绩效的研究建议，应该有更高的派息。但是，股权集中度也可以方便提取主要股东的租金，从而降低支出。 我们的结果支持了第二种假设。股权集中度是与经营中的股东权益账面价值的比例相关的。实际上，两者的高浓度，低浓度组差异在10％的顺序被发现的。
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