种对所有人都适合的做法是不可取。
一个在管理方面的研究被日益认知，组织资源基础及他与外部环境的相互依存关系不是一成不变的，他是动态组织的一部分。一个公司治理的权变概念的应用已经在一个研究公司治理的生命周期的新兴机构被制定了。这些文献确定了公司的发展的大部分阶段，和与之相联系的需要治理不久的代理冲突的变化，包括激励机制。公司治理可以被看做是一个动态系统，靠着治理可以改变不同阶段的企业的实践环境间的相互依赖关系，如新兴阶段、成长期、成熟期和衰退期。
通过不同的阶段，企业可以从一个西债的资源基地演变成一个更广泛的的资源基地。这种转变可能至少要临时依赖外部资源。这些外部资源的提供者创造新的公司治理，以确保不仅能创造财富，而且能在股东和其他利益相关者之间公平的分配。这主要反映在公司管理问责制对外部资源提供者的改变。
公司初创阶段，创业企业有一个窄的资源基础。它通常被一个创始人或家族投资者和管理问责制水平普遍偏低的外部股东拥有和控制。在此背景下，创办经理人的财富很大一部分与公司相联系的，可能会破坏股权激励的有效性，符合Core和Guay的理论。
随着企业的成长，需要接触外部的资源和专业知识来支持它的成长，它开放它的管理系统给外部的投资者，像商业银行和风险投资公司。该阶段，资源和问责制之间的平衡开始走向更加的透明并通过外部资源提供者增加监控。首次公开募股标志着一个一个公司从创业到全面发展的专业公司的重大转变。该责任的转变扩大了公司股票进入股票市场的金融资源。Allcock和Filatotchev在分析他们的上市公司高管补偿方面确定了实施股票期权的治理机制的日益重要，它的目的是满足管理者的利益和引进公司市场投资者。然而，他们也发现了这一机制的具体实施受到上市公司组织环境关于始终控制该公司的创始人的一些限制。
在下个阶段，内部和外部资源被投资在公司的成长上。当企业耗尽了重点行业的增长机会，也许就会转到相关或非相关的行业上，自利系统就变得不那么透明了。激励机制错位导致一个逐渐扩大的和多样化的管理驱动产生业绩恶化、股东价值损失的结果。在这一阶段的管理人员，特别是首席执行官，可以说是享有薪酬设计的权利的，首席执行官的薪酬安排会弱化激励机制，而更多的满足管理层的自我充实。
唯一可行的战略选择在第四个阶段，可采取上市公司的私有化。当更透明的激励和治理机制被以增加管理资产有私有制公司检测和承诺偿还债务的形式被引进，伴随着收购的衰退组织的重新调整会导致生命周期的重新振作。因此，该组织可能会缩小其活动范围，
并开始一个新周期。
总之，有效的治理机制取决于公司治理生命周期的变化，而不是符合一个普遍性的模型。组织环境强调的是组织相互依存本质的开放性，这样，成熟企业会与通过激励机制降低代理成本联系在一起，新创立企业面临不同挑战的发展和成长机会，因为它们尝试着环境的不确定性。
各种治理措施的潜在好处是公司治理研究的核心。但是，Aguilera et al认为组织环境也可能影响有关公司治理的投入的潜在成本。这些通常表现为外部性或意想不到结果，这些结果来源于广泛的组织环境，减少公司治理的有效性。这些费用会在某种程度上因为不同的环境而有所不同。
高管补偿方案可能有多种类型的相关费用，直接费用反映在资产负债表和其他会计资料上。此外，激励体制还存在不太明显的机会成本和声誉成本。这些成本可能会对激励体制有效性的多个参数产生不同的影响，意味着他们之间的潜在权衡。
以前的研究主要集中在不同形式的高管补偿的直接成本，例如与经理股票期权相关的实际开支。对经理股票期权的成本估算，股东可以使用熟悉的Black - Scholes公式，虽然这可能并不适用于无法在持有期执行期权交易的。值得注意的是，这些成本根据不同部门和不同国家的管理环境而不同。一个重要的含义是，企业成本的不同影响取决于其资源容量。例如，大企业有足够的资源，可以更容易的减少这些直接成本，然而小公司拥有多的资源就不能遵守，并可能因此面临相对较高的成本。
除了这些直接成本，高管补偿也要减少明确的成本，需要更多的间接难以量化的机会成本。这些费用设计激励机制如何影响管理者的风险观念和战略重点，从而影响对商业机会的利用，他们会根据不同的组织环境而改变。例如，Hall和MurphyRENWEI ,因为管理者在成熟的公司受归属要求和内部粉盒的限制，比所期望的从投资组合多样化的角度持有更多公司的股权，他们被迫使其持有的股票价值打折。这种“价值成本楔”是企业必须支付的价格以便产生股权支付的好处。
Allcock和Filatotchev研究了在上市公司里与股票期权相联系的机会成本的影响。这些作者将行为代理研究与“前景理论”研究整合，并建议主管的风险偏好和决策可能被问题框架所驱使，当上市公司成为影响该框架的一个重要因素之后。在仅售限制的股权交易后，上市交易可能产生成本，会阻止管理人员将他们持有的股份调整到最佳水平。因此，用先手股权作为收益或窜是的一种参考点，该作者的行为模型预测，当考虑到不同类型的奖励计划在首次公开发行的适当性时，管理者应规避风险。
最后，管理补偿机制可能影响到公司的声誉成本。例如，Hall和Shahrim讨论了执行股票期权相关的问题。股票为基础的薪酬与满足投资者预期的强大压力相结合，可以长早出不想要的结果，如意在推动股价上涨的会计信息操纵或伪造。如Hall所说，“高份额股权支付——特别是当与断的无归属的限制相结合的时候——可以怂恿那些不道德浪费的行为和价值破坏欺诈行为。”一些公司比传统的企业更容易受到声誉成本的影响，比如审计事务所或银行。最重要的一点是，直接陈本、间接成本、声誉成本的程度与特定的补偿做法相关，会影响到成本效益的不同方面，其显著性在不同的组织环境中会不同。
原文：
Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: A Contingency Framework
Executive Overview
By integrating organizational and institutional theories, this paper develops a contingency approach to executive remuneration and assesses its effectiveness in different organizational and institutional contexts. Most of the executive remuneration research focuses on the principal-agent framework and assumes a universal link between executive incentives and performance outcomes. We suggest a framework that examines executive compensation in terms of its organizational contexts and potential complementarities/ substitution effects between different corporate governance practices at both the firm and national levels. We also discuss the implications for different approaches to executive compensation policy such as ―soft law‖ and ―hard law.‖
Over the past two decades, companies around the world have increasingly moved from a fixed pay structure to remuneration schemes that are related to performance and include a substantial component of equity-based incentives. As a result, research on the economic effects of executive compensation has become one of the hotly debated topics within corporate governance research. As Bruce, Buck, and Main (2005, p. 1493) indicated, ―In recent years, literature on executive remuneration has grown at a pace rivaled only by the growth of executive pay itself.
Most of the empirical literature on executive compensation has focused predominantly on the U.S./U.K. corporate sectors when analyzing organizational outcomes of different
components of executive pay, such as cash pay (salary and bonus), long-term incentives (e.g., executive stock options), and perquisites (e.g., pension contributions and company cars). In terms of its theoretical underpinnings, previous research has attempted to understand executive compensation in terms of agency theory and explored links between different forms of executive incentives and firm performance.
This literature is motivated by the assumption that, by managing the principal-agency problem between shareholders and managers, firms will operate more efficiently and perform better. Much of corporate governance research is based on a universal model outlined by principal-agent theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986), and the central premise of this framework is that shareholders and managers have different access to firm-specific information and broadly divergent interests and risk preferences. As a result, managers as agents of shareholders (principals) can engage in self-serving behavior that may be detrimental to shareholders’ wealth maximization. A substantial body of literature is based on this straightforward premise and suggests that, to constrain managerial opportunism, shareholders may use a diverse range of corporate governance mechanisms, including various equity-based managerial incentives that align the interests of agents and principals. As Jensen and Murphy (1990, pp. 242– 243) observed, ―Agency theory predicts that compensation policy will tie the agent’s expected utility to the principal’s objective. The objective of shareholders is to maximize wealth; therefore agency theory predicts that CEO compensation policies will depend on changes in shareholder wealth.‖ The key metric in effecting positive organizational outcomes is pay-performance sensitivity (Bruce et al., 2005).
However, this ―closed system‖ approach, found predominantly within Anglo-American agencybased literature, posits a universal set of linkages between executive incentives and performance and devotes little attention to the distinct contexts in which firms are embedded. Despite considerable research effort, the empirical findings on these causal linkages have been mixed and inconclusive.For example, empirical studies and metaanalyses of the effects of executive equity-related incentives on financial performance have failed to identify consistently significant effects (see, for example, the surveys and commentaries of Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2003; Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003; Hall, 2003; and Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). In a more recent critique of agency theory, Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson (2008) pointed out its ―undercontextualized‖ nature and hence its inability to accurately compare and explain the diversity of corporate governance arrangements across different organizational and institutional contexts. Similarly, much of the resulting policy prescriptions enshrined in codes of ―good‖ corporate governance rely on universal notions of best practice, which often need to be adapted to the local contexts of firms or translated across diverse national institutional settings (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Fiss &Zajac, 2004).
In this paper we discuss an organizational approach to executive compensation that will better account for the interdependencies of incentive alignment with diverse organizational contexts and institutional environments. Building on research by Aguilera et al. (2008) we suggest that corporate governance aspects of executive compensation outlined by the agency and stakeholder perspectives must capture the patterned variation in corporate governance caused by differences in organizational contexts and their environment. Along these lines, we build on recent studies of corporate governance that have attempted to explainthe dynamic dimensions of corporate governance over the company life cycle (Filatotchev & Wright, 2005), as well as the
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