普林斯顿大学博弈论讲义10

普林斯顿大学博弈论讲义3-10

Eco514—Game Theory

Lecture10:Extensive Games with(Almost)Perfect

Information

Marciano Siniscalchi

October19,1999

Introduction

Beginning with this lecture,we focus our attention on dynamic games.The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component,and most often payo?uncertainty as well.

The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways.At the most basic level, describing the possible sequences of events(choices)which de?ne a particular game form is not problematic per se;yet,di?erent formal de?nitions have been proposed,each with its pros and cons.

Representing the players’information as the play unfolds is nontrivial:to some extent, research on this topic may still be said to be in progress.

The focus of this course will be on solution concepts;in this area,subtle and unexpected di?culties arise,even in simple games.The very representation of players’beliefs as the play unfolds is problematic,at least in games with three or more players.There has been a?erce debate on the“right”notion of rationality for extensive games,but no consensus seems to have emerged among theorists.

We shall investigate these issues in due course.Today we begin by analyzing a particu-larly simple class of games,characterized by a natural multistage structure.I should point out that,perhaps partly due to its simplicity,this class encompasses the vast majority of extensive games of economic interest,especially if one allows for payo?uncertainty.We shall return to this point in the next lecture.

Games with Perfect Information

Following OR,we begin with the simplest possible extensive-form game.The basic idea is as follows:play proceeds in stages,and at each stage one(and only one)player chooses an

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